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RECENT DECISIONS
case becomes much more like an election rather than an action to set aside an
"illusory" transfer; it becomes an election in fact for most purposes. But
even so, the widow remains excused from the procedural requirements of § 18,
that is, from actually filing an election and doing so within six months of
probate.
This decision may be termed just, considering the statute very generally.
It should not be considered sound since it was made possible by a reading of
the authorities, especially Krause v. Krause, so narrow as to vitiate their spirit.
Further, the result was achieved at the expense of additional illogical inroads
upon the statutory scheme of testamentary disposition, a course the courts
would do well to avoid.
Samuel R. Miserendino
Robert B. Fleming
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW- WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
"ACCIDENTAL INJURY" AS A QUESTION OF. FACT
Decedent steamfitter having a congenial aneurysm of a cerebral artery
collapsed immediately after emerging from a boiler which he had been cleaning. The temperature inside the boiler was above normal and the working
space limited; the work was such that it had to be performed in twenty to
thirty minute relays. Death was caused by rupture of the defective artery and
subsequent hemorrhage. The employer contended death was due to a cQndition, not an accident. Held: award of death benefits affirmed; whether an
injury was accidental, and thus compensable within the meaning of § 2(7),
N. Y. Workmen's Compensation Law, is a question of fact on which the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Board is conclusive. Broderick v.
Liebmann Breweries, 277 App. Div. 422, 100 N. Y. S. 837 (Nov. 1950) [all
compensation appeals are handled by the 3d Department.]
In determining the appropriate scope of review for a finding on a mixed
issue of law and fact, the court here adopted a fresh approach to compensation
appeals, one that emphasizes the administrative law aspect of compensation.
Mixed issues have given the courts difficulty because the statutory directives
regarding review are predicated on the traditional law/fact clasiification: fact
findings of the Board are conclusive on review, but the courts are free to correct errors of law. N.Y. Work. Comp. Law, § 20, see BENJAMIN, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN NEw YORK, first volume, p. 347. The substantial evidence
test is applied to fact findings, however, so that they are conclusive only if there
is substantial evidence to sustain them, and if that is determined the courts will
not reweigh the evidence. Matter of Helfrick v. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co.,
256 N. Y. 199, 176 N. E. 141 (1931), affd, 284 U. S. 594 (1931). The law
versus fact distinction may be of little use however when the disputed issue is
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mixed, i.e., when the Board in order to make a decision on a given fact situation
must of necessity interpret the general terms used by the statute. The compensation law like most others requires much interstitial supplementation, a process which frequently becomes inmeshed with fact finding. The statute gives
no directions regarding the handling of such issue or the proper scope of
review. It has been urged that the courts would often do well to treat mixed
issues as if they were merely factual, considering the "particularized conclusion" as largely conclusive in reliance on the special competency of the
agency to perform what is essentially an administrative task. See Stem, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries; A Comparative
Analysis, 58 HARv. L. REv. 70, 93-109 (1945).
The disputed issue of the instant case is typical of the mixed type. The
appellant contended that decedent's death was obviously due to a condition and
disease, and was not accidental within the meaning of N. Y. Work. Comp. Law,
§2(7), which defines compensable injuries as meaning only "accidental" injuries. Difficulty in applying this definition has occasioned the appeal of many
cases in which there were not the usual trauma but rather disabilities resulting
from heart strain, heat prostration and the like. One of the earliest decisions,
Uhl v. Guarantee Const. Co., 174 App. Div. 571, 161 N. Y. Supp. 659 (1916)
(pre-existing heart condition, collapse in course of usual but strenuous work),
expressly treated the issue as if it were factual; the court declined to determine
for itself whether the injury was accidental and merely applied the substantial
evidence rule. Such judicial restraint, however, became the exception rather
than the rule, as over the years the courts usually treated the issue as one of law,
relying on the many precedents to be found in an ever-growing body of case
law. See Meriam and Thornton, "Accidental Injury" in the Court of Appeals,
16 BROOKLYN L. REv. 203-216 (April 1950), setting out the development by the
courts of the substantive law on this issue using familiar common law techniques. The leading case is Matter of Lerner v. Rump Bros., 241 N. Y. 153,
145 N. E. 334 (1925), wherein an accident was defined as something extraordinary or catastrophic, assignable to a determinate or single act, identified in
space or time. This requirement was gradually relaxed, the courts sometimes
treating the issue as if it were factual in order to facilitate a desired substantive change. See e.g., Bohm v. L. R. S. & B. Realty Co., 264 App. Div. 962,
37 N. Y. S. 2d 173 (1942), aff'd, 289 N. Y. 808, 47 N. E.2d 52 (1943). By 1950
the courts were stressing the element of causal relation rather than the necessity of meeting a particular legal definition of "accident." Merian and Thornton, supra, p. 205.
Broderick v. Liebmann Breweries, the principal case, held that the issue
as to whether there was an accident "almost invariably falls within the realm of
fact, and if the facts and circumstances sustain, upon any reasonable by,
pothesis, the conclusion that an average man would view the event as acci.
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dental, then the determination of the Board is final." The court concluded
that this restricted type of review was required by a dictum in Matter of Masse
v. James H. Robinson Co., 301 N. Y. 34, 35, 92 N. E. 2d 56, 57 (April 1950),
to the effect that, whether on event is to be found an industrial accident is not
to be determined by any legal definition but by the common sense viewpoint
of the average man. The Court of Appeals in the Masse case, reversing the
Appellate Division to reinstate an award, characterized this dictum as the
proper "basis for decision" on this issue. The Broderick holding in its interpretation of the Masse dictum squarely places the accident issue in the category of
fact for review purposes. This decision accords proper respect to the expertness of the agency and to its position in dealing with claimants at first hand,
factors especially deserving of consideration in compensation cases involving
difficult medical questions. The substantial evidence test, with its inherent
flexibility, will still allow the courts freedom enough to correct injustices and
inadvertencies.
It should be noted that if mixed issues are treated as if factual the courts
can not expect the Board's decisions to be consistent, as the very nature of
fact finding precludes consistency. See the excellent discussion of this point
in McSweeney v. Hammerlund Mfg. Co., 275 App. Div. 447, 90 N. Y. S. 2d 347
(1949) (occupational disease case), and see, e. g., Chiara v. Villa Charlotte
Bronte, 273 App. Div. 834, 76 N. Y. S. 2d 59, aff'd, 298 N. Y. 604, 81 N. E. 2d
332 (1948) (inconsistent denial of award by Board on "heart" case affirmed).
Of course the strong and proper tendency of the Board to compensation disabled claimants whenever possible obviates much inconsistency in the way of
denying awards.
The evidentiary facts in the Broderick case were not in dispute, only the
proper inferences to be drawn therefrom. It has been said in compensation
cases involving other mixed issues that where the facts are undisputed only
questions of law remain. Matter of Martin v. Plaut, 293 N. Y. 617, 59 N. E. 2d
429 (1944) (whether injury arose out of and in course of employment);
Christiansenv. Hill Reproduction Co., 262 App. Div. 379, 29 N. Y. S. 2d 24
(1941), aff'd, 287 N. Y. 690, 39 N. E. 2d 300 (1942) (whether injury arose
out of and in course of employment); Bauss v. Consolidated Chimney Co.,
270 App. Div. 70, 58 N. Y. S. 2d 717 (1945) (geographical jurisdiction question). An old "accident" case is directly contrary. Campbell v. ClausenFlanagan Brewery, 183 App. Div. 499, 171 N. Y. Supp. 522 (1918). But cf.
Welz v. Markel Service, 270 App. Div. 15, 17, 19, 58 N. Y. S. 2d 476, 478, 479
(1945), affid, 296 N. Y. 640, 69 N. E. 2d 682 (1946). To hold for review
purposes that only questions of law remain when the facts are undisputed goes
in the teeth of the judicial process exemplified by the instant case. The cases
cited for this view are not authoritative, however, because they were concerned
with other issues, ones susceptible to court intervention, i.e., issues where the
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law factor of the mixed issue may be readily separable. In this light it is
worth noting that in three of these cases the court was reversing the Board to
find for the claimant; in the fourth (Martin v. Plaut) the Court of Appeals was
faced with an affirmed finding from below so that only questions of law could
be considered. And it is generally held in compensation that inferential facts
are just as "factual" for review purposes as are evidentiary ones, E.g. Gordon
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 300 N. Y. 652, 90 N. E. 2d 898 (1950) (extreme
case).
The bare result of the principal decision is not noteworthy, considering the
prior "heart" cases, but the technique or review employed is significant, its
express adoption being highlighted by the failure of the court to cite even one
precedent for substantive authority. The courts are not thus abdicating their
decisive role as regards legal questions; rather they are placing increased reliance on the agency, and properly so, considering the remedial and largely
non-political nature of compensation and the record of honest administration
achieved by the Board.- Objectively considered, the decision means at least
that within the substantive limits defined by existing case law the Board's conclusion on the "accident" issue will control; very likely it means that the same
view will be taken when the Board ventures into uncharted areas beyond those
limits, a result to be welcomed. The limited review applied here may be a concomitant of the emphasis on casual relation already noted. The decision is not
surprising as there has been a growing tendency of the courts to discuss all
types of compensation issues in "fact" terms. This case, however, presents the
desirable review process in full form, worthy of careful consideration and
wide application.
Robert B. Fleming
TAXATION - FEDERAL INCOME TAX - INTEREST IN LAW
PARTNERSHIP AS A CAPITAL ASSET
Max Swiren, member of a Chicago law firm, acquired by a series of purchases a 30% interest in the partnership for a net total outlay of some $18,000.
In 1944 he valued the interest at about $43,000, of which $35,000 represented
his allocable share of unpaid fees, billed and unbilled. Swiren sold his interest
that year for $40,000. In filing his income tax return for 1944, on a cash receipt basis, he reported as capital gain the sale price less his investment. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue contended that the amount received was
ordinary income. The Tax Court, after allowing taxpayer to recover his capital
investment tax-free, held that so much of the remaining consideration as represented unpaid fees was ordinary income. On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals reversed (2-1), holding that the partnership interest was a
capital asset and the gain a capital gain. Swiren v. Commissioner, 183 F. 2d
656 (7th Cir. July 1950), cert. denied 340 U. S. 912, 71 S. Ct. 293 (Jan. 1951).

